Fetal Life and
Abortion: Human Personhood at Conception
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Introduction
Much discussion about legalized abortion centers around the question of WHETHER FETAL LIFE SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY LAW, especially when its protection would jeopardize other values which are sometimes esteemed to be of greater worth. Thus, fetal life is weighed against the parents' freedom to be unencumbered by the care of a child, or against the convenience of a society which wishes to stabilize its population growth, or even against the unhappiness which the child might experience because of being physically handicapped by malformation or psychologically handicapped by not being wanted by those who would be obliged to care for him after he were born.
When one thinks about legal matters, one sees that it is not the function of civil law to specify the relative value of fetal life in comparison with other values. Yet, time-honored laws protecting fetal life have been done away with on exactly that basis, as when "marital privacy" is given as justifying abortion.
LEGAL PROTECTION HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM FETAL LIFE WITHOUT ADEQUATE C0NSIDERATION OF REASONS WHICH CONCLUDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THAT FETAL LIFE WITH THE LIFE OF A HUMAN PERSON.
The Supreme Court, on January 22, 1973, admitted its incompetence to make any judgment for or against such an identification. But, in practice, its decision of that date established, by force of law, the completely relative value of fetal life, contrary to the Court's own declaration of incompetence to do so.
It would be a logical starting point to inquire WHETHER FETAL LIFE SHOULD BE RESPECTED FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO VALUES OUTSIDE OF ITSELF, such as being "wanted" by its parents. For this reason, it is increasingly important that the nature of fetal life be investigated, with a view to determining as far as is possible whether or not it is the life of a human person. Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this discussion present some arguments in favor of an affirmative conclusion. If fetal life is accepted as being human life, there is a basis for respect within the unborn, namely, his or her humanity, which is shared in common with all other human beings.
It is surprising to see that there are some who deny that the fetus is a human person, yet have no evidence for their position. Their position remains a mere assumption, whether postulated by themselves or accepted, without proof, from others. For example, there are some who believe that the unborn are not fully human, but are only capable of becoming human and, therefore, should be called "potential human beings." (See Section 3) Others admit the unborn to be actual human beings, even from conception, but would deny them personhood, as though it were possible to be human without being a person. (See Section 4)
Although THE PRIMARY QUESTION IN ABORTION DISCUSSIONS IS THE STATUS OF WHO, OR WHAT, IS BEING KILLED BY THE PROCEDURE, there are some secondary questions which are important also. If many people in a society are uncertain whether the unborn are human persons, wouldn't respect for all human life be lessened by the legalization of abortion? It would seem that disregarding the ethical principle "TO NOT ACT IN THE CASE OF DOUBT," either by the individual or the society, would be damaging to both.
Section 6 suggests that whenever there is any uncertainty whether the fetus of human parentage is a human person, responsible action follows the ethical principle: In case of doubt, proceed as though the fetus were a person, because of the gravity of the consequences, should it indeed be a human person. Section 7 shows some of the secondary, effects of abortion on society, especially resulting from the liberalization of legal abortion in the State of New York, prior to Roe v. Wade.
IN CONSIDERING AN AMENDMENT OF OUR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION to include explicitly the unborn of human parentage in the Bill of Rights, some people assume that such an amendment would cause more problems than it could solve. One has gone so far as to say that all existing legal records would have to be modified, to change dates of birth to dates of conception. But this appears to be more a facetious than a real problem.
Some persons fear that such an amendment would be strictly anti-abortion, as though no case of abortion, thereafter, could be legally justified. Actually the amendment would not prohibit aborting; rather it would recognize the unborn, from conception, to be a fellow human being. The amendment, by its very nature, would provide the legal basis for solving the problems which it raises. . . that in each case, whether of rape, danger to the mother's life, etc., the due process of law would insure justice and equity for both parties involved in the dispute. At the present time, the mother is judge, jury and executioner, if she so wishes. This is hardly the American way to handle the contest of rights.
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